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THE TENDER OFFER IN KOREA: AN ANALYTIC
COMPARISON BETWEEN KOREA AND THE UNITED
STATES
Kwang-Rok Kimt
Abstract: Even though the tender offer system in Korea was established in 1976,
there were very few tender offer transactions until 1997. However, after Korea's
economic crisis in late 1997, the Korean government not only took a series of structural
reform measures to improve the securities market system, but also widely opened the
financial markets to foreign countries by abolishing or amending restrictions on foreign
investment. The 1998 reforms to the Korea Securities Exchange Act included significant
changes to tender offer regulations, making hostile takeovers more feasible. Since that
time, the tender offer has been used as a tool to acquire control of corporations in Korea.
In contrast, tender offers have been prominent in the United States' legal world of
corporations and securities for many decades and the law regarding tender offers is well
established. This article examines the Korean tender offer regulations in comparison to
analogous aspects of the more established securities law of the United States, offering
recommendations for amendments to Korean law where applicable. Korea should revise
its tender offer regulations to simplify confusing aspects of the regulations and process,
force disclosure of information that is important to investors but not currently part of
mandatory disclosure, and ease excessive restrictions on trading and voting rights in the
tender offer process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tender offers' represent the most significant tactical development in
the United States' corporate takeover arena, and have been the "hottest"
subject in the legal world of corporations and securities for three decades.
2
Prior to the passage of the Williams Act, bidders could make very short
tender offers, lasting only several days.3 The Williams Act was passed in
1968, and exists today to ensure that shareholders of target companies have
the information and time necessary to consider offers, that shareholders are
treated equitably, and that a competitive balance is maintained between
tender offerors4 and target companies.
5
The Republic of Korea ("Korea") established a tender offer system in
1976, yet no tender offer transactions occurred until 1994. Since the first
successful tender offer in 1994, tender offers have been used to acquire
control of several corporations. 6  Recently, tender offer regulations have
changed significantly as a result of amendments made to the Korean
Securities and Exchange Act ("KSEA"). Accordingly, the popularity of
tender offers will likely increase.
This Article examines the Korean tender offer regulations in
comparison to analogous aspects of the more established securities law of
"Tender offer" will refer to a cash tender offer throughout this Article.
2 See Joseph B. Cahill, Notes & Comments, Circuits Split on the Elements of Williams Act
"Manipulation -- Validity of Tender Offer Defenses Uncertain, 60 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 935, 935 (1984).
For more information about phenomenon of early tender offers, see LOUIS Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 492 (2d ed. 1988); cf RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR.,
SECURITIES REGULATION 683 (6th ed. 1987); JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 562 (2001).
3 See generally JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 2, at 687.
4 The "tender offeror" refers to the bidder throughout this article. "Bidder," in general, means "one
who offers to pay a specified price for an article offered for sale at a public auction or to perform a certain
contract for a specified price." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (6th ed. 1990). However, in the context of
a tender offer, a bidder is anyone seeking to acquire control of the target company by the tender offer.
5 See William C. Tyson, The Williams Act After Hanson Trust v. SCM Corporation: Post-Tender
Offer Purchases by the Tender Offeror, 61 TUL. L. REv. I, 1 (1986).
6 The first successful hostile tender offer in Korea was Hansol Paper Manufacturing Company's
tender offer to Donghae Banking Corporation on October 26, 1994. However, there have not been many
subsequent tender offer transactions, primarily because one of the characteristics of the Korean economy is
that business people do not generally like hostile mergers and acquisitions.
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the United States, offering recommendations for amendments to Korean law
where applicable. Part II describes the development and current state of the
securities markets in Korea and in the United States, and provides an
introduction into the existing securities regulations in both countries. Part
III compares tender offer regulations in Korea with those in the United
States, and identifies the problems that may arise from tender offers in Korea.
Part IV offers suggestions for improving Korean tender offer regulations and
securities practice.
II. SECURITIES MARKETS AND EXISTING SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN
KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES
A. Korea
1. Development of the Korean Economy and Securities Market
Up until the 1960s, Korea was a typical underdeveloped and largely
agrarian country. However, due to the success of its export-driven
industrialization, Korea has transformed itself relatively quickly into a
modem, industrialized country. The key to Korea's success was its adoption
of an outward-looking development strategy based primarily on exports in
the heavy chemical industry.7 Accordingly, large-scale capital investment
has consistently focused on the heavy chemical industry and the Korean
economy has been highly dependant on the this industry and closely-related
industries. When the market for one major industry is active, its growth can
easily affect the growth of other major Korean industries. Conversely, when
the market is stagnant, many industries may simultaneously record very low
growth.
The Korean economy is composed of large conglomerates called
"chaebols."8 In Korea, chaebols operate in every industry from agriculture
to media production. For example, four large chaebols generate over 47%
of the total sales in Korea and more than half of the country's exports.
7 Korea Securities Dealers Association, Annual Securities Market in Korea (2000), ch. I. p. 13, at
http://www.ksda.or.kr/Portfoliokorea/publications/publications.htm.
8 In the past, chaebols contributed to the outstanding economic growth of Korea. The Korean
government and chaebols have been in companionship for a long time with respect to rapid economic
development. However, chaebols are responsible for the current economic crisis. See Woon-Youl Choi &
Yeong-Ho Woo, Corporate Governance and Disclosure: Recent Development in Korea, Presentation at the
FMA Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois (1998), available at http://www.ksri.org/menu2.htm. For more
information about relationship between the Korean government and chaebols, see Kon-Sik Kim, Corporate
Governance in Korea, 8 J. COMP. BUS. & CAP. MKT. L. 21 (1986).
VOL. 10 No. 3
MAY 2001 TENDER OFFERS IN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES 501
Chaebols are commonly managed by one family who first established the
conglomerate. The families are reluctant to lose their market share, and thus
continue to exert great force in the Korean economy.
9
The performance of the Korean securities market l ° directly reflects the
interdependence of Korean industries. In particular, the financial crisis that
began in late 1997 demonstrated that changes to the structure of the Korean
capital market were necessary. Since being offered financial relief from the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF") in 1998, the Korean government has
been obliged to change the regulatory system and the structure of its
securities market in hopes of restoring the Korean capital market's validity.
The 1998 amendments to the KSEA were meant to (1) improve the standard
of corporate governance and enhance corporate management; and (2) open
the financial market to foreign countries by abolishing or amending some
restrictions on foreign investment and introducing new securities market
systems. Problems with the 1998 amendments exist largely because the
Korean economy urgently needed foreign investment at the end of 1997, and
legislators did not have ample time to consider every legal issue presented
by the new laws. In addition, the opening of the financial market caused
confusion in the Korean financial market, which had not seen extensive
competition under the former system.
The two main government bodies that supervise the securities market
in Korea are the Ministry of Finance and Economy ("MOFE") and the
Financial Supervisory Commission ("FSC").tt As for self-regulatory bodies,
9 For example, when there was a hostile merger and acquisition ("M & A") transaction against the
company Midopa by Shindongbang in 1997, the Federation of Korean Industries announced that they
would jointly work against the hostile M & A. In addition, the Federation of Korean Industries suggested
to the Korean government that the government should make regulations on hostile M & A for the majority
shareholder's stable management in 1996. The Federation of Korean Industries consists of sixty
institutions, 366 major industries, and some special members.
'0 The Korean securities market is divided into two parts: the stock exchange market and the Korea
Securities Dealers Association Automated Quotation ("KOSDAQ") market. The former is operated by the
Korea Stock Exchange; the latter is the marketplace for trading stocks of companies registered with the
Korea Securities Dealers Association. In the early 1990s, the need for an organized system to operate the
over-the-counter ("OTC") market became evident as the number of listed companies grew, and investor
interest increased. The KSDA created the KOSDAQ system with the intention of positioning the market
the way NASDAQ is positioned in the U.S. stock market. By virtue of this new system, it became possible
to trade KSDA-registered stocks through the linking of all of the member securities firms. The Securities
and Exchange Act details the types of securities that may be traded on the securities market. Such
securities include government and municipal bonds, bonds issued by a corporation established under
special laws, investment certificates, corporate bonds, stocks or warrants, Korean depository receipt
("KDR") issued by the Korea Securities Depository, commercial papers ("CP"), and securities options.
Stock index futures are also regarded as securities.
" The Korean Securities and Exchange Act ("KSEA") abolished the existing Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") in February 1998, and the FSC was established on April 1, 1998 as a
consolidated financial supervisor over the three separate sectors of securities, banking, and insurance. The
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there are the Korea Securities Dealers Association ("Association") 12 and the
Korea Stock Exchange ("KSE").13
2. Regulations Regarding Corporate Takeovers in Korea
Hostile mergers and acquisitions are not favored by the corporate
climate and public opinion in Korea. Since tender offers are hostile methods
of achieving business combinations, there have been few tender offer
transactions in Korea. The tender offer system was established in 1976, yet
as of June 1999, only twenty-three tender offer transactions had been carried
out.
On February 24, 1998, the Korean government amended the foreign
stock exchange regulations and released a new policy for free foreign
exchange and foreign investment. Specifically, the Korean government
relaxed its limitations on foreign equity ownership.14 Foreign investors may
now acquire one-third of an issuer's equity securities class without the
approval of a subject company's board of directors. Previously, foreign
investors were only able to acquire 10% of the class of equity securities. In
addition, the limitation on foreign subscription for the public purchase of
shares was abolished, permitting all kinds of foreign capital exchange,
including foreign stock investment without restriction.' 5 Foreign investors'
main objective of the FSC is to contribute to the development of the national economy by establishing an
affirmative regularity in credit system and fair financial practice, as well as protecting the rights of
depositors and investors. The FSC established a sub-committee, the Securities and Futures Commission
("SFC"), to carry out duties set forth in the Act of the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organization
and the KSEA. The main functions of the SFC are to investigate unfair trading, such as insider trading and
market manipulation in the securities and futures markets, manage accounting standards and audit review-
related business, conduct pre-deliberation of major issues concerning the securities and futures markets
before the FSC's discussion, and undertake other tasks delegated by the FSC, the KSEA, and other related
Acts. See Woon-Youl Choi & Yeong-Ho Woo, supra note 8, at 4-5.
12 The KSDA, established in November 1953 as a non-profit, self-regulatory organization, became a
special legal entity under a 1997 amendment to the KSEA. See Jeungkwon Gorae Bop [Korean Securities
and Exchange Act] art. 162 (S. Korea) [hereinafter KSEA].
13 The KSE, established in February 1956, provides an organized market in Korea for buying and
selling securities. In 1987, an amendment of the KSEA established the KSE as semi-autonomous judicial
entity owned and operated by its member securities companies. The KSE only grants membership to
licensed securities companies. Since there are no specialists who function like wholesalers for an assigned
company's securities, the KSE operates various systems for keeping an orderly market, such as a daily
price fluctuation limit, suspension of trading, etc. See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 71.
14 See Oikukin Tuja Chokjin Bop Sihaengryung [Korean Enforcement Decree of the Foreign
Investment Promotion Act], art. 2(2) (S. Korea).
15 The Korean government, through the former Ministry of Finance and Economy, pronounced an
agreement with the IMF to expand the foreign investment limitation from 26% to 50% per item, and from
7% to 50% per person on December 11, 1997. Since then, the Korean government has expanded 50% per
item of the investment limitation to 55%, and completely abolished the foreign investment limitation in
May 1998.
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hostile takeover activities 16 in the secondary market are now fully
permitted. 17
The Korean government made other changes to open its market to
foreign exchange and investment. It abolished the 25% mandatory tender
offer system within the stock market.i 8 Further, the former 10% limit on the
number of issued and outstanding stocks that any investor could obtain in
Korea has been deleted.' 9 Finally, due to enhancement of the "five percent
rule," investors can now easily obtain information concerning the ownership
of a target company's stocks.2 °
However, due to their hurried enactment, these amendments were
completed without sufficient scholarly research about securities regulation.
Accordingly, they are designed to meet the needs of the unique situation of
Korean enterprises during the economic crisis. These amendments should
be carefully reconsidered in order to ensure that Korean tender offer
regulations keep up with the ultimate purpose of securities regulations in the
21
economic system.
The basic structure of tender offers in Korea under the KSEA may be
summarized as follows. The tender offer is defined as "an offer to buy
stock ... or a solicitation of an offer to sell stocks . . . against many and
unspecified persons . . . outside the securities market or intermediation
16 The limitation on ownership of Korea Telecom, Korea Electronic Power Corporation, Pohang Iron
and Steel Company, and some public companies, including eighty-one Korean defense industries, was
raised from 25% to 30% in the aggregate, and from 1% to 3% individually.
17 From December 11, 1997, when the foreign investment limitation was expanded to 50%, to
January 31, 1998, the Korean Stock Exchange ("KSE") recorded 2.1 trillion won (about U.S. $1.7 trillion)
as a net purchase, and eighteen foreign companies or funds reported to the KSE that they acquired more
than five percent of equity of specific KSE-listed companies. For more information, see The Foreign Fund
Strategy, JOONGANGILBO (Seoul, Korea), Feb. 5, 1998, at 3, available at http://www.joongang.co.kr/
search/index.html.
"8 Under the 25% mandatory tender offer system, shareholders wishing to hold 25% or more of
outstanding voting shares were obligated to acquire them through a tender offer. In addition, the number of
shares for a tender offer needed to be more than fifty percent of outstanding voting shares, including their
securities. This 25% mandatory tender offer system was abolished on February 24, 1998. See Woon-Youl
Choi & Yeong-Ho Woo, supra note 8, at 5.
19 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 200.
20 The objective of the five percent rule, which is the disclosure rule for block trading of listed stocks
on the KSE or KOSDAQ market, is to promote market transparency and to protect existing majority
shareholders from hostile M & A's. Generally, acquisition of 5% of the total issued shares and any
changes of approximately 1% may not be important information affecting corporate management. Under
the five percent rule, any investor who owns 5% or more of the shares of KSE-listed or SDA-listed
corporations (holdings of the affiliated persons to be combined) must report the status ownership of shares
and such changes to the FSC, KSE and KSDA within five days after a change in ownership of shares of one
percent or more. See id. art. 200-2.
21 The KSEA provides: "The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the development of the national
economy by attaining wide and orderly circulation of securities, and by protecting investors through fair
issuance, purchase, sale or other transactions of securities." Id. art. 1.
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market operated by the Association . *.'.., Tender offers are mandatory
when any person intends to acquire 5% or more of voting stock or any other
securities through purchase, exchange, bid, or any other acquisition by
transfer from more than ten shareholders in a six-month period. 3 Anyone
wishing to tender an offer should designate a securities firm as an agent;
24
file a tender offer statement with the FSC;2 5 give public notice in at least two
major daily newspapers; 26 and submit copies of the statement to the target
27company, the KSE, and the Association. After completion of the filing,
notifying and submitting procedures, a ten-day waiting period must pass
28before the tender offer becomes valid. When a tender offer provision is
violated, the FSC, KSE, and Association enforce the tender offer under the
KSEA.
B. United States
During the 1960s, tender offers, appeared in the United States,2 9 and
now are widely regarded as "the most effective means . . . for wresting
control from a resisting management," as increasing numbers of investors
have embarked on campaigns to acquire controlling stock interests in
publicly-held corporations. 30 In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act
3
'
as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act"). 32 The Williams Act was a federal legislative response "to the
increased use of cash tender offers in corporate acquisitions, a device that
had 'removed a substantial number of corporate control contests from the
reach of existing disclosure requirements of the federal securities law."'
33
The Williams Act was designed to protect investors faced with tender offers
"by ensuring that they would receive sufficient and timely information to
22 Id. art. 21(3). The "Association" refers to the Korea Securities Dealers Association.
23 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21(1); Jeungkwon Korae Bop Sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree
of the Securities and Exchange Act], art. 10-2 (S. Korea) [hereinafter Enforcement Decree].
24 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 11-4(1).
21 See id. art.ll-4(4).
26 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 22(2).
27 See id. art. 22.
28 See id. art. 23(1).
29 Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1, 2 (1978).
30 DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITtES REGULATION 107 (1996).
3' The Williams Act is contained in §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1999).
32 Id. §§ 78a-m.
33 Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (1982) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S.
1, 22 (1977)).
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decide whether to tender their shares."
34
The Williams Act added the following provisions to the Exchange Act.
Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act35 is designed to provide shareholders with
knowledge of potential purchasers' identities and intentions by requiring
disclosure from all owners of greater than 5% of any class of securities.36
Section 13(e)37 limits an issuer in purchases of its own securities. 38 The SEC
occasionally uses Section 13(e) to "regulate self-tender offers, issuer
repurchases in the open market, and going-private transactions. 3 9  Section
14(d), the major provision affecting tender offers, requires any person who
plans to make a tender offer to submit all materials used in connection with
the tender offer to the SEC and to submit a disclosure statement similar to
the one required by 13(d).4° Section 14(e) prohibits fraud and "material"
misrepresentation in connection with a tender offer.4 1 Specifically, 14(e)
makes unlawful any untrue statement of material fact, any omission tending
to make statements misleading, and any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts in connection with any tender offer. Section 14(e) also
gives the SEC authority to define and prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent such acts.
Although tender offers have proven to be a highly effective method of
taking over corporations, neither the Exchange Act nor the primary SEC
Rule applying to tender offers defines the meaning of the term "tender
offer.",42 However, a conventional tender offer 4 3 in the United States, as
defined by extensive case law, is a public offer or solicitation by a company,
an individual or a group of persons to purchase during a fixed period of time
34 Neil Fabricant, Hostile Tender Offers: Can the States Shut Them Down?, 22 J. CORP. L. 27, 30
(1996). When it was finally enacted, the Williams Act added Sections 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e), and 14(f)
to the Exchange Act. See Marina Jaudenes, Note, Sweeping the Market: The Use and Control of A Bold
Acquisition Technique, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 607, 611 (1988).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
36 Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act specifically requires any person acquiring beneficial ownership
of more than 5% of a class of registered equity securities to disclose, within ten days of the source and
amount of funds used to make the purchase, any plans or proposals to make major changes in the issuer if a
takeover is the purpose of the purchases, the number of shares presently owned, and the details of any
arrangements with other parties concerning the shares to be acquired. Id.
Id. § 78m(e).
38 Richard L. Epling, Exchange Offers, Defaults, and Insolvency: A Short Primer, 8 BANK. DEV. J.
15, 19-20 (1991).
39 Mark L. Berman, Note, SEC Takeover Regulation Under the Williams Act, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV. 580,
587-88 (1987).40 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d).
41 Id. § 78n(e).
42 Epling, supra note 38, at 21.
43 For more information about the "conventional tender offer," see Note, The Developing Meaning of
"Tender Offer" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250 (1973).
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all or a portion of a class or classes of securities of a publicly-held
corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms for cash and/or
securities.44
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TENDER OFFERS IN KOREA AND THE
UNITED STATES
A. Scope of Application of Tender Offer Regulations
The KSEA Article 21(1) states the scope of tender offer application in
Korea under the title of "Applicable Object of Tender Offer.
45
1. Defining the Tender Offer
a. Korea
Article 21(3) of the KSEA specifies that an offer is deemed a "tender
offer" if it is "... against many and unspecified persons, [and] . . . outside
the securities market. 46
1) "Outside the securities market"
Tender offers in Korea are limited to transactions "outside the
securities market.',7 Accordingly, tender offer regulations do not apply to
securities transactions at the KSE or at the intermediate market operated by
4 Seeid. at 1251.
45 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21(1). Article 21(1) provides:
A person who intends to acquire voting stocks or any other securities as prescribed by the
Presidential Decree [hereinafter referred to as "stocks, etc."] through purchase, exchange, bid or
any other acquirement by transfer [hereinafter referred to as "purchase, etc."] from persons not
less than the number as prescribed by the Presidential Decree outside the securities market or the
intermediation market operated by the Association during the period as prescribed by the
Presidential Decree shall acquire the stocks, etc., through tender offer, in case where the total
number of the stocks, etc., held [including the cases prescribed by the Presidential Decree as
owning or its equivalent] by the person himself and specially connected persons [this means the
specially connected person as prescribed by the Presidential Decree; hereinafter the same shall
apply] after the purchase, etc., is 5% or more of the total number of the stocks, etc. [including
the case where the person himself and specially connected persons who have acquired 5% or
more of the total number of stocks, etc., make purchase, etc., of the stocks, etc.].
Id.
46 Id. art. 21(3). The "Association" refers to the Korea Securities Dealers Association.
4 See id. art 21(3).
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the Association.48 The reason for this restriction is that transactions "outside
the securities market" are less secure. Transactions occurring within the
KSE are secured by the nature of disclosure, equitability, and transferability,
through self-regulation and other rules.
Tender offers often place pressure to sell on uninformed shareholders,
prompting them to sell their stocks without sufficient information.
However, since the KSEA limits the use of tender offer regulations to
securities transactions occurring "outside the securities market," 50 tender
offers need not be formed in KSE transactions despite possible shareholder
pressure.
2) "Many and unspecified persons"
The "many and unspecified persons"'51 phrase in the KSEA means that
the number of people who are targets of the offer must be numerous in order
for the tender offer regulations to apply. The Enforcement Decree of the
KSEA defines "many" to mean at least ten. 52 In other words, a solicitation
of an offer to sell stocks from less than ten people is not a tender offer. It is
difficult to define a fixed number for "many and unspecified persons,"
particularly when the tender offer applies to a group of people that includes
many qualified shareholders who have extensive knowledge and experience
about a securities investment. However, legislators have evidently judged
that there is no need to protect shareholders through the tender offer if the
number of persons is less than ten.53 In particular, when an offeror buys
stocks several times from specific persons up to 5%, or when the offeror
buys stocks from "many but specified persons," the tender offer cannot be
" The Korea Securities Dealers Association, established in November 1953 as a non-profit, self-
regulatory organization, became a special legal entity under the revised 1997 Securities and Exchange Act.
See Woon-Youl Choi & Yeong-Ho Woo, supra note 8, at 5.
. 49 See Kon-Sik Kim, Kaejung Jungkwongoraebopsang-ui Gongiungmaesujedo [Tender Offer System
under the Revised Securities and Exchange Act], INKWONKWA JUNGUI [HUMAN RIGHTS & JUSTICE], Apr.
1997, at 26.
50 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21(3).
szSee id. art. 21(3).
52 See id. art. 2 1(1). Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-2(2) provides:
The term 'persons not less than the number prescribed by the Presidential Decree' means the
case where the aggregate number of persons who are the counterparts of the purchase of the
stocks concerned, etc. and that of the persons who have been the counterparts of the purchase of
the stocks concerned during the period is 10 or more.
Id.
53 Kim, supra note 49, at 32. See also Jong-Joon Song, Kangjegonggaemaesujedoui Bopriwa
Choohooui Bopjuk Moonjae [The Legal Principal of Compulsory Tender Offer and Future Legal
Problems], 76 HANKUK BUBHAK WONBO, Nov. 5, 1997, at 11, 13.
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forced because the offeror did not buy from "unspecified persons."
b. United States
The United States Supreme Court, in Blue Chip Stamps. v. Manor
Drug Stores,54 stated that the analysis of the term "tender offer" should begin
with the language of the Williams Act.55 However, the Williams Act lacks a
definition provision. Under Section 3(b) of the Exchange Act, the SEC has
the authority to define the term "tender offer."
56 Various SEC proposals 57
have suggested that Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act should apply in more
specific circumstances. 58  However, none of these proposals have been
successful. Thus, it is necessary to examine the SEC's attempt to define the
meaning of "tender offer," and therefore the applicability of Section 14(d)
disclosure requirements, through case law.
A federal district court in the Southern District of New York first
considered the definition of a tender offer in an open market transaction in
Wellman v. Dickinson.59  In Wellman, the court used an eight-factor test
suggested by the SEC to determine whether tender offer regulations
54 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
" See id. at 756.
56 15. U.S.C. § 78c(b). "The Commission and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, as to matters within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power by rules and regulations to
define technical, trade, accounting, and other terms used in this chapter, consistently with the provisions
and purposes of this chapter." Id.
'I See Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,385, [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,374, at 82,600 (Nov. 29, 1979).
58 The first proposal stated that Section 14(d) should apply to (1) one or more offers to purchase or
solicitations of offers to sell securities of a single class; (2) during any forty-five-day period; (3) directed to
more than ten persons; and (4) seeking the acquisition of more than 5% of the class of securities. Id. at
82,603. The second proposal would have applied Section 14(d) when (1) offers to purchase or the
solicitation of offers to sell are disseminated in a widespread manner; (2) the price offered represents a
premium in excess of five percent or $2 above the current market price of the securities being sought; and
(3) the offers do not provide for a meaningful opportunity to negotiate the price and terms. Id. at 82,604-
05. Other rule proposals stated that all purchases of the target company's stocks made by a tender offeror
or an affiliate within a certain period after the termination of the tender offer for the stocks of that company
could be integrated with the offer for purpose of the disclosure, withdrawal, increased price, and perhaps
the proration provisions of Section 14(d). See Tyson, supra note 5, at 36-39. The SEC has proposed two
rules to this general effect, but they were never adopted. See Tender Offers-Notice of Proposed Rules and
Schedules, Exchange Act Release 12,676, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,659,
at 86,692 (Aug. 2, 1976) (proposing that open market, private, and other purchases by the tender offeror,
made within forty days after the termination of a tender offer, be integrated with the tender offer for
purposes of the Section 14(d)(l) disclosure, the Section 14(d)(5) withdrawal, and the Section 14(d)(7)
increased price provisions); Proposed Tender Offer Rules and Schedule, Exchange Act Release 15,548,
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. rep. (CCH) 81,935, at 81,206 (Feb. 5, 1979) (same, but only for
purposes of the Section 14(d)(7) increased price provision).
'9 Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd on other grounds, 682 F.2d 355
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
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applied. 60 Applying these eight elements to the facts of the case, the court
found that "all but the element of publicity were present and therefore
classified the transactions cumulatively as a tender offer.",
6 1
After Wellman, most courts follow this eight-factor test. In SEC v.
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.,63 District Court Judge Tashima held that:
"(1) the [SEC]'s eight factor test, rather than the two element S-G
Securities64 test, was the applicable benchmark; and (2) since only two of the
eight indicia were present the repurchase program did not constitute a tender
offer. ,65
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in upholding the District Court's
decision in Carter Hawley,66 mentioned the eight-factor test as a guideline,
but not a compulsory provision, so that "not all factors need be present to
60 See id. at 823-24. The Wellman court said that:
Even if this transaction were not seen as a conventional tender offer, it would not necessarily fall
outside the ambit of Section 14(d). As discussed above, the concept of a tender offer has never
been precisely defined either in the Williams Act itself or by the Commission. Congress left to
the Commission the task of providing through its experience concrete meaning to the term. The
Commission has not yet created an exact definition, but in this case and in others, it suggests
some seven elements as being characteristic of a tender offer: (1) active and widespread
solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an issuer; (2) solicitation made for a
substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase made at a premium over the
prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable; (5) offer
contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number
to be purchased; (6) offer open only a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected to pressure to
sell his stock. These characteristics were recently accepted as appropriately describing the nature
of a tender offer. See Hoover v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., C. 79-1062A (N.D.Ohio June 11, 1979).
In that case, the Commission also had listed an 8th characteristic not included here whether the
public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target company precede or
accompany rapid accumulation of large amounts of the target company's securities. The reason
this last characteristic was left out undoubtedly was because publicity was not a feature of this
transaction.
Id.
61 Jaudenes, supra note 34, at 613.
62 See In re CTS Corp. v. M. Coons, 428 N.E. 794, 800 (Ind. App. 1981). For a critical analysis, see
Brascan Ltd., v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
63 Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1248 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
64 S-G Sees. Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Mass. 1978). The court argued the
matter of shareholders pressures, and concluded that the tender offer occurs
where there is: (1) a publicly announced intention by the purchaser to acquire a substantial block
of the stock of the target company for purposes of acquiring control thereof, and (2) a
subsequent rapid acquisition by the purchaser of large blocks of stock through open market and
privately negotiated purchases, such actions constitute a tender offer for purposes of Section
14(d) of the statute.
Id. at 1126-27. The court also found that "(t)his publicity created a risk of the pressure on sellers that
the disclosure and remedial tender offer provisions of the Williams Act were designed to prevent." Id. at
1126.
65 Carter Hawley, 587 F. Supp. at 1248.
66 Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F. 2d. 945 (9th Cir. 1985).
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find a tender offer; rather, they provide some guidance as to the traditional
indicia of a tender offer." 67  The Ninth Circuit also recognized that "the
shareholder pressure did not result from any untoward action on the part of
Cater Hawley Hale ("CHH")... Rather, it resulted from market forces, the
third-party offer, and the fear that at the expiration of the offer the price of
CHH shares would decrease.",68 In Hanson Trust PLC. v. SCM Corp., the
Second Circuit also considered the relative pressure on shareholders in
holding tender offer regulations inapplicable. 69 Holding that the acquisition
of 25% of a company's stock in five private purchases and one open-market
purchase was not a tender offer, the court said:
Since the purpose of Section 14(d) is to protect the ill-informed
solicitee, the question of whether a solicitation constitutes a
"tender offer" within the meaning of Section 14(d) turns on
whether, viewing the transaction in the light of the totality of
circumstances, there appears to be a likelihood that unless the
pre-acquisition filing strictures of that statute are followed there
will be a substantial risk that solicitees will lack information
needed to make a carefully considered appraisal of the proposal
put before them. 0
Thus, it appears that shareholder pressure is an essential part of what
constitutes a tender offer in the United States.
67 Id. at 950. See also Zukerman v. Franz, 573 F. Supp. 351, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1983). The Zukerman
court held that "Section 14(e) does not require a plaintiff to have been subject to a formal tender offer
before becoming eligible for protection under said statute," and found that:
[T]he alleged cash merger proposal at issue in this cause satisfies the following factors: I.
Whether there is an 'active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders' for shares of
an issuer; 2. Whether the solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's
stock; 3. Whether the offer to purchase is made at a premium over the prevailing market
price; 4. Whether the terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable; 5. Whether the offer
is contingent on the tender of a fixed minimum number of shares, and perhaps, subject to
the ceiling of a fixed maximum number to be purchased; 6. Whether the offer is open for
only a limited period of time; 7. Whether the offerees are subjected to pressure to sell their
stock; and 8. Whether public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target
company precede or accompany a rapid accumulation of large amounts of target company
securities.
Id.
68 Id. at 952.
69 Hanson Trust PLC. v. SCM Corp., 774 F. 2d. 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
'0 Id. at 57.
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In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,7' the Second
Circuit held that a series of stock sales, made on the stock market and to
relatively sophisticated investors, did not constitute a tender offer, noting
that the offer price was not above market price and that shareholder pressure
was not a factor in the transactions. Curtiss- Wright established that although
stock market transactions may trigger the disclosure requirements of Section
13(d) of the Exchange Act, they are not subject to the tender offer
regulations of Section 14(d).
This case law analysis illustrates that even though most courts follow
the SEC's eight-factor test to determine whether a given solicitation is a
tender offer, there is still no specific and definitive standard.
c. Comparison
As demonstrated above, the KSEA more concretely prescribes the
definition of a tender offer than United States law does. In practice, the
basic meaning of tender offer in Korea is not generally very different from
that in the United States. However, the backgrounds of each country's
securities markets are quite different.
Since transactions at the KSE are not recognized as a tender offers,
despite evidence of other tender offer characteristics, including strong
shareholder pressure, shareholders in Korea have-no opportunity to learn of
possible takeover bids achieved on the stock market as they would in the
United States through the disclosure requirements of Section 13(d) of the
Exchange Act. Therefore, Korea should consider applying tender offer
regulations to certain transactions within the stock market that include
substantial shareholder pressure. In addition, the standardized legal
treatment with the numerical criterion is not working effectively in the
securities market. The numerical reference in the "many and unspecified
persons" clause should be estimated on a case-by case basis considering the
72
conditions of each transaction.
7' Kennocott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
72 In Hanson, the court said that:
Although many of the above-listed factors are relevant for purposes of determining whether a
given solicitation amounts to a tender offer, the elevation of such a list to a mandatory 'litmus
test' appears to be both unwise and unnecessary. As even the advocates of the proposed test
recognize, in any given case a solicitation may constitute a tender offer even though some of the
eight factors are absent or, when many factors are present, the solicitation may nevertheless not
amount to a tender offer because the missing factors outweigh those present.
Hanson, 774 F. 2d. at 57.
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2. The Offeror
a. Korea
Article 21(1) of the KSEA defines the "tender offeror" as any person
who, after a series of purchases 73 within six months, holds more than 5% of
that class of stock. The tender offeror includes not only the purchaser,
including an individual, a corporation, or any other organization, but also
"specially connected persons ' ' 74 who may be "specially related persons ' 75 or
"persons acting in concert. 7 6
"Persons acting in concert" are defined as those who jointly acquire or
dispose of stocks . . . through an agreement or contract with a tender offeror,
or make an agreement with a tender offeror to exercise the voting right or
right in concert. 7 Where the person concerned is an individual, "specially
related persons" include family members, as enumerated in the Enforcement
Decree of the KSEA.78 If the person concerned is a corporation or other
organization, the "specially related persons" include officers, affiliated
companies, and officers of affiliated companies.79
If a "specially related person" possesses less than 1,000 stocks, or
presents evidence that he is not a "person in concert," he is not regarded as a
"specially related person" in the application of the tender offer regulations. 80
b. United States
The Williams Act provides that "any person" may be a "tender
offeror," and the SEC Rule further defines "any person." Under SEC Rules,
a tender offeror is one who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
73 See supra Part III.
74 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 2 1(1); Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-3.
71 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-3(2).
76 See id. art. 10-3(4). For meaning of the phrase "specially related persons," when the "person"
concerned is an individual, see Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-3 2(1). For the meaning of the
"specially related persons," when the "person" concerned is a corporation or any other organization, see
Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-3 2(2).
77 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 10-3(4); see Jong-Joon Song, supra note 53.
78 In the case of an individual, "specially related persons" include a spouse, a paternal blood relative
of not more than six degrees of relationship and the wife of paternal blood relative of not more than four
degrees of relationship, the husband and children of a paternal blood relative of not more than three degrees
of relationship, a maternal blood relative of not more than three degrees of relationship and the spouse and
children of such person, a paternal blood relative of not more than two degrees of relationship of the spouse
and the spouse of such person, a lineal ascendant of the birth parents of an adoptee, a person who enters a
family as an adopted child and his spouse. See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-3(2).
9 See id. art. 10-3(2).
so ld. art. 10-3(3).
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more than 5% of a class of any equity security.8' SEC Rule 13d-3 provides
that the definition of a beneficial owner includes "persons acting in concert."
Section 13(d)(3) defines the term "persons acting in concert," as "two or
more persons [who] act as a partnership, syndicate, or other group for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer.,
8 2
c. Comparison
The Williams Act does not regulate "specially related persons," such
as relatives and families. In contrast, under the KSEA, the notion of
"specially related persons" is much broader than the notion of "persons
acting in concert." It is possible in Korea for a "specially related person," to
not realize he is a "specially related person" because the scope of the
provision is so broad. For this reason, the meaning of "specially related
person" should be narrowed, or merged with the definition of the "persons
acting in concert" in order to make the scope of the tender offeror more clear.
3. Conditions that Trigger Disclosure Requirements
a. Korea
Under Article 21 (1) of the KSEA, a person who possesses at least 5%
of any class of voting stocks through purchase from at least ten people
outside the securities market during the specified period shall acquire the
stocks according to tender offer regulations.8 3 The Enforcement Decree
specifies that the period in which to apply tender offer regulations is six
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d); SEC Rule 13d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a). For information on the
exceptions, see Rules and Regulations Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-l(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (2000).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3). However, it was not clear under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act
whether organizing a group of stockholders owning more than 5% of a class of equity securities with a
view to seeking control of the company, but not acquiring any additional securities, was restricted. In GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), "the four Milsteins received 324,166 shares of GAF
convertible preferred stock, approximately 10.25% of the preferred shares outstanding, when the Ruberoid
Company, in which they had substantial holdings, was merged into GAF in May 1967." Id. at 713. The
courts have split as to whether "the agreement to act together constitutes an 'acquisition' by the 'group,'
triggering the filling requirement of Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act." Id. at 715. For a contrary view,
see Bath Indus. Inc. v. Bolt, 427 F. 2d. 97 (2d Cir. 1970) (denying that Section 13(d)(3) applied to such a
situation and holding that a group must agree to acquire more shares before the filing requirements of
Section 13(d) are triggered). See id. at 109-10. Adopting the GAF view, SEC Rule 13d-5(b)(1) clearly
states, "when two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or
disposing of equity securities of an issuer, the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired
beneficial ownership." See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(l).
83 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 2 1(1).
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months prior to the date on which the stock purchase is actually conducted. 4
The 5% refers to the percentage of holding stocks that the tender offeror will
possess after the purchase of the stocks, including previously held and newly
purchased securities. As the examples in Table 1 illustrate, if the cumulative
number of shareholders involved in a given acquisition exceeds ten, and the
percent of stock acquired exceeds five, for all transactions six months prior
to the final transaction, then each transaction during the six month period is
subject to tender offer regulations.
Table 1. Do the Tender Offer Regulations Apply?
Situation: Purchases occurred outside the securities market during a six-month period
Stocks Stock Purchases During Stock Purchase At Close of
Owned Period Period Mandatory
Before the Tender
Period Stockholders Stock (%) Stockholders Stock (%) Offer?
0% 0 0% 10 5% YES
5 1% NO
0% 6 3% 3 5% NO
4 3% YES
3 1% NO
0% 10 3% 3 3% YES
5% 0 0% 10 1% YES
10 1% NO
10 2% YES
The purpose of setting up a six-month period may be to expose to
shareholders take-over plans whereby persons seek to gain a controlling
interest in a target company through a series of small securities transactions
over time.85 In general, acquisition of 5% of a company's total issued shares
will not affect corporate management. Nonetheless, such information may
seriously affect the market in terms of supply and demand. For this reason,
such disclosures are considered important market information for
8 Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-2(1): "The term 'the period prescribed by the
Presidential Decree' means the past six months prior to the date on which the purchase of the stocks is
conducted."
85 For more information, see YOUNG-MOO SHIN, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT, SEOUL, KOREA,
386 (1989).
VOL. 10 No. 3
MAY 2001 TENDER OFFERS IN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES 515
investors.
86
b. United States
The Williams Act does not contain a time period analogous to Korea's
six-month period. However, Exchange Act Section 13(d) performs the same
function by requiring continuing disclosure of all take-over plans from
purchasers of securities who own more than 5% of that class -of securities.
c. Comparison
While shareholders of target companies often desire sufficient time to
make decisions on offers, six months is far more than enough time to meet
the objective of notifying shareholders and is too long to allow for the fast
pace and rapidly changing conditions of today's capital market. Because of
its impracticality, the six-month period should be shortened or abolished.
4. Applicable Securities
a. Korea
Under the KSEA, the applicable securities used in calculating when
tender offer regulations apply are "voting stocks or any other securities as
prescribed by the Presidential Decree." 87 The KSEA describes "equivalent-
to-ownership" securities, which do not belong to the tender offeror or the
"specially connected persons," but are included in calculating whether
acquired stock equals or exceeds 5%. 88 Owning an "equivalent-to-
ownership" security means owning the right to a legal action that will give
rise to the acquisition of voting rights.
89
86 Trading of listed stocks on the KSE and KOSDAQ markets also gives rise to disclosure
obligations under the rules that govern trading within each market. The purpose of these rules is similarly
to promote market transparency and to protect existing majority shareholders from hostile mergers and
acquisitions.
87 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21(1).
8" See id. art. 21(1). The meaning of "the equivalent to ownership" is derived from the concept of
"beneficial ownership" of the United States' securities laws. See Jong-Joon Song, Major Securities
Purchase's duty to Disclose under the United States Securities and Exchange Act, 5 CHOONGBUK UNIV. L
REv. 211 (1993). The meaning of the phrase "owning or its equivalents" is described in Enforcement
Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-4. For more information about the phrase "option to purchase stocks," see
KSEA, supra note 12, art. 189-4.
89 "Equivalent-to-ownership" securities are included when one (1) holds stocks for one's own
account irrespective of name; (2) has a claim for the delivery of stocks by the operation of law, sale and
purchase agreement, or other contracts; (3) has a right of acquisition or disposal of the stocks by the
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Additionally, the Enforcement Decree specifies that applicable
securities include "potential securities." Potential securities are stock
certificates, certificates representing preemptive rights, convertible bonds,
certificates of bonds with warrants, and certificates of exchangeable bonds
belong to the scope of applicable securities. 90 In some cases, preferred
stocks may also be included.91
The inclusion of "potential securities" complicates the calculation of
the percent of securities owned by a given purchaser. First, the number of
the securities with attendant voting rights must be determined. When an
investor owns only voting stocks, the percent of securities owned is simply
equal to the number of voting stocks owned divided by the total number of
voting stocks. When an investor owns potential securities, the number of the
potential securities must be converted into the equivalent number of the
voting stocks by the method shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Conversion of the Potential Securities to Equivalent Numbers of Voting
Stock
Potential Securities Conversion Formula Note
( Number of Voting Stock)
CRPR: Certificate Representing The number of voting stocks that
Preemptive Rights are objects of the Certificates
CB: Convertible Bonds Par Price of CB divided by Price of Fractions of equivalent
Issuing Securities shares not included
BW: Certificates of Bonds with The number of voting stocks that
Warrants are the objects of the Certificates
EB: Certificates of Exchange The number of voting stocks that
Bonds are objects of the Exchange Bonds
b. United States
The Williams Act does not enumerate the applicable securities in
detail. 92 However, the SEC specifically excludes non-voting securities from
operation of law or a money trust contract, a security contract or other contracts; (4) has right to sale and
purchase of stocks in accordance with the unilateral promise; and (5) has a securities option with regard to
the sale and purchase of stocks. Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-4.
9 See id. art. 10.
91 There are different opinions about preferred stocks. Namely, even though the KSEA does not
mention preferred stocks, preferred stocks must be included in the applicable securities of the tender offer if
preferred stocks gain the voting right. See Hong-Yeol Chun, JEUNNGKWONGORAEBOP [SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE ACT] 471 (1997). See also Kim, supra note 53, at 30.92 However, Section 13(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act states:
[A]ny equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to Section 12 of this title, or any
equity security of an insurance company which would have been required to be so registered
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its definition of the term "equity security" 93 and has specifically included in
its definition of "equity securities:"
[A]ny stocks or similar security, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit sharing agreement, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, voting trust
certificate or certificate of deposit for an equity security, limited
partnership interest, interest in a joint venture, or certificate of
interest in a business trust; or any security convertible, with or
without consideration into such a security, or carrying any
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or
any such warrant or right; or any put, call, straddle, or other
option or privilege of buying such a security from or selling
such a security to another without being bound to do SO.
94
c. Comparison
Since the applicable securities for tender offer regulation in the United
States includes only those classes with voting rights, 95 the calculation of the
percentage of securities owned is much simpler than in Korea. The
complicated calculation of the rate in Korea can cause the unexpected results
whereby a transaction including potential securities causes a purchaser to
unwittingly own more than 5% of that class of securities. Thus, the
applicable securities of tender offers in Korea needs to be limited to the
voting securities.
5. Exceptions to the Application of Tender Offer Regulations
a. Korea
The KSEA permits purchasers to acquire 5% or more of a
corporation's stock without following the tender offer procedure in special
except for the exemption contained in Section 12(g)(2)(G) of this title, or any equity security
issued by a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940 or any equity security issued by a Native Corporation pursuant to Section 37(d)(6) of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l).
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(i).
14 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1.
" See id.
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circumstances. 96 Those special circumstances are purchases: (1) for the
purpose of cancellation; (2) of stocks affected in response to the exercise of
appraisal rights; (3) from a "specially related person"; (4) by the exercise of
preemptive rights, or rights to demand for conversion or exchange; and (5)
as prescribed by the FSC, which do not infringe upon the rights and interests
of other stockholders.
97
b. United States
The Williams Act also provides some exceptions to the application of
the disclosure requirements of Section 13(d). 98 Those exceptions include:
(1) any acquisition or offer to acquire securities made or
proposed to be made by means of a registration statement under
the Securities Act of 1933, (2) any acquisition of the beneficial
ownership of a security which, together with all other
acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same class
during the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 percent
of that class, (3) any acquisition of an equity security by the
issuer of such security, and (4) any acquisition or proposed
acquisition of a security which the SEC shall exempt from this
subsection.9 9
c. Comparison
Although there are some exceptions listed in the Williams Act, not all
of them apply to tender offers. However, application of the eight-factor
Wellman test °0 allows for exceptions to the tender offer regulations on a
case-by-case basis. Therefore, in practice, the scope of the exemptions in
the United States is broader than those listed in the Williams Act, and can be
broader than those listed in the KSEA.
In Korea, since the purpose of the KSEA is not only to protect
96 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21(1).
97 Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 11.
98 See Securities Exchange Act § 13(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6).
99 Id. For the contents of "SEC's exemption" provided by Section 13(d)(6) of the Exchange Act, see
Rules and Regulations Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-6.
too See supra Part III.A. I .b.
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investors through the fair issuance, purchase, or sale of securities,' ° 1 but also
to harmonize securities transactions by making it easy to acquire securities,
expanding the scope of these exceptions would be a reasonable way to
encourage the securities market.
B. Making a Tender Offer
1. The Tender Offer Procedure
a. Korea
A person who intends to propose a tender offer must file a tender offer
statement with the FSC.10 2 The tender offer statement must conform to the
standards prescribed by the FSC and must contain information regarding the
purpose of the tender offer, details of funds for purchase, and conditions
such as period, price, and settlement day.'0 3
A tender offer becomes effective ten days after the date the tender
offer statement was filed with the FSC. 104 The purpose of the ten-day
waiting period is to allow sufficient time for investors to avoid making hasty
decisions to sell. However, the waiting period can cause some undesired
results, including increasing the likelihood of insider trading.
The tender offer period is not less than twenty days and not more than
sixty days from the end of the ten-day waiting period. 0 5 In the event that a
counter tender offer is filed during the tender offer period concerned, the
tender offer period may be extended to the last day of the counter tender
offer period. 1
06
Under the language of the KSEA, the ten-day waiting period does not
apply to the tender offeror. In fact, the tender offeror may make an offer to
buy stocks, or solicit an offer to sell stocks by using a tender offer
prospectus, as soon as she files a tender offer statement with the FSC.
0 7
Consequently, there is an apparent possibility of a tender offer transaction
during the waiting period. To limit this inconsistency, the waiting period
101 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 1. "The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the development of
the national economy by attaining wide and orderly circulation of securities, and by protecting investors
through fair issuance, purchase, sale or other transactions of securities." Id.
102 Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 11-4(4).
:03 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21-2(l).
04 See id. arts.'21-2, 23(l).
"' See id. art. 23(1); Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 11-5.
"6 Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 11 -5.
... Id. arts. 13, 24.
log Id.; cf KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21(1).
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has been interpreted so that the tender offeror may conduct a tender offer,
but the stockholder may not accept the offer or solicitation until the waiting
period is over.
Table 3. Tender Offer Procedure In Korea
Order Procedure Relevant Law Days
I Filing the Tender Offer Statement with the FSC KSEA Art. 21-2 0
2 Sending a Copy of the Statement to the Issuer KSEA Art. 22 0
Publishing the Statement to Newspapers
3 Submitting the Copy of the Statement to KSE KSEA Art. 22 0
4 Preparing a Prospectus for the Tender Offer KSEA Art. 24 0-10
EDKSEA5 9
5 Tender Offering Art. 11-5 20-60
6 Withdrawal of the Tender Offer' 0  KSEA Art. 24-2 20-60
7 Purchase and Pay KSEA Art. 25-2 3
When a tender offer is carried out, the price that is paid must be
suitable consideration. The price, in the concept of the tender offer, means
cash or securities, including a certain premium over the market price. There
is no limitation on the premium rate in any related laws, but the purchase
price of a tender offer must be uniform."' In addition, the full amount of the
tendered stocks must be purchased immediately on or, the day following, the
expiration date of the tender offer period.112 However, the tender offeror
does not have a duty to purchase all the stocks stated in the tender offer
statement when the tender offeror publicly announces conditions to that
effect.113 In that case, the conditions should be set forth in the tender offer
statement, and should be publicly announced at the time of the
commencement of the tender offer.1 4 When the proportional purchase rule
applies under the announced conditions, purchases will be made in
proportion to offers, up to the number of stocks scheduled to be purchased
109 Here, EDKSEA means the Enforcement Decree of the KSEA.
... See infra Part III.B.2.
111 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 25-2(2).
"' Id. art. 25-2(1).
113 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 13-2. The conditions are as follows: (1) All of the
tendered stocks shall not be purchased where the total number of tendered stocks is less than the number of
stocks scheduled to be purchased through tender offer; and (2) purchase will be made proportionally up to
the number of stock scheduled to be purchased through tender offer and all or a part of excess will not be
purchased where the total number of tendered stocks exceeds the number of stocks scheduled to be
purchased through tender offer. See id.
"' See id. art. 13-2.
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through the tender offer, and all or a part of the excess will not be
purchased." 5 Table 3 summarizes Korea's tender offer procedure.
b. United States
Under the Williams Act, no person may make a tender offer that
would result in his owning more than 5% of a class of securities unless he
has filed with the SEC, and fumishes to each offeree, a statement containing
certain information required under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act.I,
6
Section 13(d) requires any person that acquires more than 5% of any class of
securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act to file with the
issuer of the securities, and with the SEC, within ten days, a statement
setting forth "(1) the background of such person; (2) the source of the funds
used for the acquisition, (3) the purpose of the acquisition; (4) the number of
shares owned, and (5) any relevant contract, arrangement, or understanding
with any person with respect to any securities of the target company.
'' 17
A tender offer must remain open for at least twenty days from the date
the offer is first published or otherwise given to security holders. If the
tender offer involves a roll-up transaction,"18 and the securities being offered
are registered on Form S-4 or Form F-4, the offer must remain open at least
sixty days." 9 Where a greater number of securities is deposited.than the
offeror offered to purchase, the offeror must buy shares in proportion to the
number of shares deposited by each depositor. 20 This is known as the "pro
rata rule.' 121 Section 14(d)(7) of the Exchange Act outlines what is known
as the "best price rule." According to the best price rule, the offeror who
increases the price before the tender offer has expired must pay the increased
consideration to each shareholder whose shares are tendered, not merely to
those who tender after the increase. 1
22
Further, if the offeror increases the price during an offer, the offeror
must keep it open for at least ten days after the announcement of the increase,
Id. art. 13-2-2.
IS See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1).
See id. § 78m(d).
18 A roll-up transaction is a transaction involving the combination or reorganization of one or more
or partnerships in which some or all of the investors in any of such partnerships will receive new securities.
17 § C.F.R. 229.901. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-7 for more about the unlawful tender offer practices in
connection with roll-ups.
19 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a).
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6).
121 CLARK C. ROBERT, CORPORATE LAW 551 (1986).
122 Id.
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even if the original offer period expires before the ten days have elapsed.
123
Rule 14e-1 is intended to reduce the pressure on shareholders to tender, but
also gives the target company additional time to find a "white knight" or to
make its own counter-proposal.
24
In addition, Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act provides a general
anti-fraud provision that makes it unlawful for any person to omit or
misstate a material fact, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative act, in connection with the tender offer.1 25 Table 4 summarizes
the tender offer procedure in the United States.
Table 4. Tender Offer Procedure In The United States
Order Procedure Relevant Law Days
I Filing the Schedule 14D-1 with the SEC Section 14(d)(1); 0Rule 14d-3
2 Sending Copy of Statement to Target Company Rule 14d-4 0
Publishing the Statement to Newspapers
3 Dissemination of the Tender Offer by the Target Rule 14d-5(b)(3) 3 (B)
Company to Their Shareholders
4 Shareholders' Rights to have their Shares Tendered on Section 14(d)(6) 10 (C)
a Pro-Rata Basis
5 Target Company's Duty to Disclose Rule 14e-2 10 (B)At least
6 Tender Offering Rule 14e-l(a) 20 (B)
At least
7 Withdrawal of the Tender Offer by the Issuers Rule 14d-7 2tlBs20 (B)
8 Prohibition on Omissions, Misstatements, Fraud, Section 14(e) all
Manipulation, and Deception I
2. Withdrawal and Cancellation of Tender Offers
a. Korea
The KSEA provides a strict cancellation procedure because of the risk
of confusion to the securities market, and particularly the target company,
inherent in cancellation. 26 Generally, a tender offeror may not withdraw a
tender offer after it has been made. 127 However, the Enforcement Decree of
the KSEA provides exceptions for withdrawal of a tender offer 128 until the
"'3 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a); see ROBERT, supra note 121, at 551.
124 See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 1, at 744.
125 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
126 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 23-2; Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 12-6.
127 Id. art. 24-2(1).
"s See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 12-7.
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last day of the tender offer period.1
29
Since the cancellation and invalidity of the tender offer is limited to
those exceptions stated in the regulation, it is clear that the tender offeror
cannot cancel or nullify the tender offer simply after acquiring the number of
securities that he needed. However, the tendering stockholder who accepts
an offer to buy stocks may cancel such a subscription at any time during the
tender offer.
b. United States
In the United States there is no provision for cancellation of a tender
offer by the offeror. Section 14(d)(5) 3 ° and SEC Rule 14d-7131 provide only
for withdrawal by the seller. Any person who has deposited securities
pursuant to a tender offer has the right to withdraw their securities by written
notice to the offeror during the offer period. 32 The tender offeror may also
impose other reasonable requirements. 1
33
Regarding over-subscribed tender offers, Section 14(d)(6) requires the
bidder to prorate shares received during the first ten days, but SEC Rule 14-
8 extends the proration period throughout the life of the offer.'
34
C. Disclosure Obligations
In general, the corporate disclosure system is designed to provide
investors with accurate information on a company's past, present, and future
management and its financial status, including future project plans. Such
29 When the counter tender offer is made, the tender offer can be withdrawn. It can also be
withdrawn when a tender offeror falls under the following conditions: death; dissolution; bankruptcy;
dishonor of bills or checks issued; merger; and transfer or acquisition of important business. Id. art. 12-7.
See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 24-2(1).
"0 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) states:
Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders may be
withdrawn by or on behalf of the depositor at any time until the expiration of seven days after
the time definitive copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given
to security holders, and at any time after sixty days from the date of the original tender offer or
request or invitation, except as the Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules, regulations, or
order as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
ld.
I31 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7. This Rule is titled "Additional Withdrawal Right."
132 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a): "In addition to the provisions of section 14(d)(5) of the Act, any
person who has deposited securities pursuant to a tender offer has the right to withdraw any such securities
during the period such offer, request or invitation remains open." Id.
3' See id. § 240 14d-7(b).
134 For more information, see JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 1, at 745.
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disclosures are intended to help investors make rational investment
decisions, thereby ensuring fair securities practice.
1. The Tendor Offeror's Duty
a. Korea
To enable investors to make rational investment judgments, both the
Korean Commercial Act 135 and the KSEA 136 provide for a disclosure system.
Also, the disclosure requirements of the KSEA make it compulsory for
corporations to disclose major information on corporate management and
assets during the process of securities trading. The KSEA features a variety
of mechanisms to ensure promptness, updated value, accuracy, reliability
and utility of use of the important corporate information.
1) The tender offer statement
The KSEA requires any person who intends to conduct a tender offer
to file a tender offer statement using the form prescribed by the FSC.137 The
tender offer statement shall contain the purpose of the tender offer, details of
the funds to be used for purchase, conditions such as period, price and
settlement day of purchase, and "other matters" that are listed in the
Enforcement Decree of the KSEA, Article 11-4(2). 13' All required
135 Disclosure under the Korean Commercial Act is an indirect disclosure system designed to protect
the interest of shareholders and creditors. Namely, the Korean Commercial Act provides the maintenance
and disclosure of articles of incorporation and minutes of meeting, obligation to send, maintain or disclose
business performance report, B/S, P/L and audit reports by CPA, rights to watch the accounting records of
minority shareholders, and so forth. See Sang Bop [Korean Commercial Act], arts. 373 (Minutes of general
Meeting), 412-2 (Director's Duty to report), 414 (Auditor's Liability), 449 (Approval and Public Notice of
Financial Statements), 466 (Shareholder's Right to Inspect Accounting Books) (S. Korea). The Act is
sometimes referred to as "Korean Commercial Code," however, the term "Korean Commercial Act" will be
used throughout this Article.
136 See KSEA, supra note 12, arts. 3 (Registration of Issuer), 5 (Disclosure of Documents Filed for
Registration), 12 (Preparation and Disclosure of Prospectus), 18 (Disclosure of Registration Statement and
After-Report), 26 (Disclosure of Tender Offer Statements).
137 Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 11-4(4).
138 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21-2(1). For more information about "other matters" see Enforcement
Decree, supra note 23, arts. 114(3), 114(2). In addition, for the importance of the information to be
disclosed, the KSEA urges the tender offeror to attach additional documents, such as a transcript of resident
registration, articles of association and a transcript of company register; documents proving the holding of
the balance at financial institutions not less than the amount of money necessary for tender offer;
documents proving the holding of securities that a tender offeror intends to deliver as a consideration;
documents proving that the necessary permission, authorization or recognition was given in case such
recognition is needed for the purchase of stocks; and a draft of the public notice of commencement of
tender offer. Id. art. 114(3).
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information in the tender offer statement is very important to ensure that all
transactions in the securities markets are fair.
139
Once the tender offer statement has been filed with the FSC, the
offeror must make the statement public. The tender offeror must
immediately transmit a copy of the tender offer statement to the issuer of the
stocks pertaining to the tender offer. 140 In addition, to inform minority
shareholders, the tender offeror must publish the tender offer statement in at
least two major daily newspapers. 141 The tender offeror also must submit a
copy of the statement to the KSE or the Association. 42 Finally, the tender
offer statement must be submitted simultaneously to the target company, for
the benefit of the existing majority stockholders and the company itself, and
to the FSC, for an inspection of accuracy.
2) Amendment of the tender offer statement
The tender offeror may change the conditions of the tender offer,
subject to the KSEA's prohibition on amendments that are unfavorable to
the tendering stockholders. Prohibited amendments include a reduction of
the purchase price, a decrease in the amount of stocks that are intended to be
purchased, an extension of the payment period, a reduction of the period of
the tender offer, an alteration of the type of consideration to be paid to the
tendering stockholder, and other amendments prescribed by the FSC that are
unfavorable to the tendering stockholders. 43 Amendments to the tender offer
statement that are favorable to the tendering stockholders can be carried out
at any time. When a tender offeror intends to modify the purchase
conditions, the tender offeror must file an amendment statement under the
guidelines designated by the Ordinance of the Prime Minister by the date on
which the tender offer expires.
144
The FSC may issue an order to amend the tender offer statement if the
statement is incomplete in its form or inadequately states any required
material information. 145 Where such an order is issued, the tender offer
139 A key feature of the securities market lies in fairness, a major premise and an objective of the ideal
securities market. The securities market can effectively fulfill its functions and roles only on the trust of
investors. Therefore, unfaithful disclosure, insider trading, and price manipulation are three significant
actions defined as "securities crimes."
140 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 22(1).
41 Id. art. 22(2); Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 6-8.
142 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 22(2).
141 Id. at art 23(2); Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 12-6.
" KSEA, supra note 12, art. 23-2.
45 See KSEA, supra note 12, arts. 11(1), 23-2(2).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
statement is construed to have not been received by the FSC. 14 6 The order to
amend the statement is issued at the discretion of the FSC and the KSEA
does not hold the FSC responsible for any abuses regarding such orders. A
provision should be added to the KSEA holding the FSC responsible for
arbitrary abuses of amendment orders.
b. United States
In the United States, the Williams Act provides the basic framework
for assessing disclosure obligations in the tender offer context. 147 Section
14(d)(1) requires the tender offeror to prepare and file a Schedule 14D-1
before commencing a tender offer for more than 5% of a target company's
stock. The disclosure required in Schedule 14D-1 begins with the disclosure
required by Schedule 13D.
1) SEC schedule 13D
Under Section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act, any person who directly
or indirectly acquires more than 5% of any class of the securities registered
pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act must file a Schedule 13D
statement with the SEC. Moreover, the investor must send a copy of the
13D statement to the issuer of the securities in question and to each
exchange where the securities were traded. The information that must be
disclosed on the 13D includes facts about the security and the issuer, the
identity and background of the purchaser, the source and the amount of the
funds or other consideration used in the acquisition, the purpose of the
transaction, the interest in the securities of the issuer, the contracts,
arrangements, understandings or relationships with respect to the securities
of the issuer, and the materials to be filed as the exhibits.' 48 Although
Section 13(d) does not expressly require disclosure of any intent to acquire
control, disclosure of the "purpose of the transaction" has been augmented
by SEC regulations to require disclosure of further information regarding the
purchaser's future plans for the issuer. 149
A loophole in Section 13(d) known as the ten-day window currently
allows some abuse of the regulations by securities purchasers. During the
'4 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 11(2).
141 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e); 78n(d)-(f). See MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS
200 (1983).
141 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, items 1-7.
141 See id. item 4.
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ten-day period after a person crosses the 5% threshold of Section 13(d),
thereby incurring disclosure obligations, the tender offeror may purchase
securities up to an additional 20% of the class of the equity securities. By
using this method, he might be able to pay less for that 25% stake than he
would have to pay after his Schedule 13D disclosure. 150 Consequently, the
SEC would like to eliminate the "ten-day window" by requiring the tender
offeror to file the day after buying his first 5% and prohibiting the tender
offeror from buying any more shares until the filing has been completed.
However, Congress has not acted on the SEC's request.
151
2) SEC schedule 14D-1
After nearly ten years of the federal tender offer regulation under the
Williams Act, the SEC adopted a permanent tender offer disclosure
schedule. 152 SEC schedule 14D-1 mandates disclosure of substantially more
information by the tender offeror than Schedule 13D.
153
In addition to the information required by Schedule 13D, 14D-1
requires disclosure of other specific items relating to the persons retained,
employed, or to be compensated by the target company and the purchaser's
financial statement and relationship with the target company.' 54 Further, as
of a 1977 SEC Release, most tender offerors believe it is necessary to
include their own financial statements in their Schedule 14D-1.'" This 1977
Release, which concerns Regulation 14D, states that all financial
information must be included in a Schedule 14D-1 when it is "material.'
' 56
Although the Release did not resolve all the ambiguities concerning
materiality, it did point to several nonexclusive factors that the tender offeror
should evaluate when disclosing financial information.' 57 Although case law
"So See id. § 240.13d-l(f)(2).
151 See ROBERT, supra note 121, at 553.
152 Arther M. Borden & Jeffrey M. Weiner, An Investment Decision Analysis of Cash Tender Offer
Disclosure, 23 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 553 (1978).
""' Id. at 553-54.
14 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100, items 1-11.
155 JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 1, at 686-87.
156 Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release 13,787,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,256, at 88,371 (July 21, 1977).
157 These included, with limitation:
(1) the terms of the tender offer, particularly those terms concerning the amount of securities
being sought, such as any or all, a fixed minimum with a right to accept additional shares
tendered, all or none, and a fixed percentage of the outstanding; (2) whether the purpose of the
offer is for control of the subject company; (3) the plans or proposals of the bidder described in
Item 5 of the Schedule; and (4) the ability of the bidder to pay for the securities bought in the
tender offer and/or to repay any loans made to the bidder.
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provides few clear guidelines concerning disclosure requirements,1 Courts
have affirmed the heightened disclosure of 14D-1, reasoning that the
required financial information may be material to a target shareholder in
determining whether to tender because the shareholder may decide that it is
more attractive to remain a minority shareholder under a new, and possibly
more efficient, management.'
59
c. Comparison
Disclosure of the intent to acquire control is required in the tender
offer statement by both SEC regulations in the United States 60 and the
Enforcement Decree in Korea
161
In both the United States and Korea the tender offeror must file
additional tender offer disclosures if a material change occurs in the
information set forth in the original tender offer statement. 62 However, in
Korea, an outside party, namely the KFSC, may issue an order to amend the
tender offer statement when the FSC determines that the statement is
incomplete in its form or inadequately states any required material
information.163 To prevent the FSC's arbitrary abuse of an amendment order,
a provision giving guidance to the FSC in its use of the order to amend
should be added to the KSEA.
2. Target Company's Duty
a. Korea
In the case of a hostile tender offer, the target company's approval,
objection, or neutrality of the takeover bid is very important information for
shareholders when making the decision whether or not to tender their shares.
Id. (citing JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 1, at 740-41).
158 See Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1974, aff'd 488 F.2d
207 (2d Cir. 1973); Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D.Del. 1975); Copperweld Corp.
v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D.Pa. 1977).
59 See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 1, at 740. The SEC Schedule 14D- 1 also requires that the tender
offeror must state the purpose of the tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100, item 6.
160 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
161 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 11-4(2).
162 SEC Rules and Regulations Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-3(b); KSEA, supra note 12, art. 23-2. In Korea, such material changes are enumerated in the Act,
such as the reduction of purchase price, the decrease of the number of stocks, the extension of the payment
period, the purchase amount and other purchase conditions. For more about the other conditions, see
Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 12-6.
163 See KSEA, supra note 12, arts. 11(1), 23-2(2).
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Nevertheless, the KSEA does not require the target company to disclose
such material information. The target company may pro-actively voice its
opinion on the tender offer, but is not required to do so by the KSEA.' 6
However, the Korean Commercial Act has been interpreted to require
the target corporation in the midst of a tender offer to disclose material
information as a part of the director's duty to the company.1 65 Consequently,
even though the KSEA does not specifically create a duty for the target
company to disclose information, the target company's board of directors
should voice its opinion about a hostile takeover, and disclose other
information related to the tender offer, in accordance with the general
director's duty to the company under the Korean Commercial Act.' 66 When
the target company presents its opinion, the target company must
immediately submit a written statement describing its opinion of the tender
offer with the FSC and the KSE or the Association.' 67 Once this is done, the
issuer of stocks may present the opinion through means of advertisement,
correspondence or other documentation in order to raise awareness regarding
the tender offer. 1
68
b. United States
Under the Exchange Act, the target company must publish or transmit
to shareholders a statement disclosing whether it accepts, rejects, or is
unable to take a position with respect to the tender offer. 16 9 The statement
'64 See id. art. 25.
165 Korean Commercial Act, supra note 135, arts. 399(l)-(3).
166 See id. arts. 399(1)-(3).
167 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 25, provides:
An issuer of stocks, etc. for which a tender offer statement has been filed, may present his
opinion on the tender offer concerned under the conditions as prescribed by the Presidential
Decree. In this case, the issuer shall file a written statement describing the contents of such
opinion without delay with the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Korea Stock
Exchange or the Association, as the case may be.
Id.
168 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 13. The issuer of stocks "may present his opinions on
the said tender offer by means of advertisement, correspondence or other documents. In this case, the
important matters shall not be omitted and the contents shall be such that no misunderstanding may be
caused therefrom." Id.
169 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a) provides:
As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or
practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act, the subject company, no later than 10
business days from the date the tender offer is first published or sent or given, shall publish, send
or give to security holders a statement disclosing that the subject company: (1) Recommends
acceptance or rejection of the bidder's tender offer; (2) Expresses no opinion and is remaining
neutral toward the bidder's tender offer; or (3) Is unable to take a position with respect to the
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must include the reason for the target company's position, including the
inability to take a position, and must be sent to shareholders within ten
business days from the date the tender offer was first published. 7 0
A Schedule 14D-9 must also be filed by the target company's
management. 17 1 The information to be disclosed on the 14D-9 includes a
description of the security, target company, and tender offeror, the
solicitation or the recommendation, the persons retained, employed, or to be
compensated, the recent transactions and the intent with respect to the
securities, certain negotiations and transactions by the target company, and
any additional material information. 1
72
c. Comparison
In Korea, unlike in the United States, the target company does not
have a statutory duty to disclose information material to a tender offer, most
notably its opinion of any takeover bid. 73 Accordingly, a less specific and
less enforceable duty has been read into the director's obligation to the
company under the Korean Commercial Act. 174 However, this needs to be
expanded to also cover the target company's duty to disclose material
information. Yet, the most effective solution would be to amend the KSEA
to require the target company to disclose all material information for the
investor's protection, including its opinion of any impending takeover bids.
3. Prohibition Against Using Non-Public Information
a. Korea
Material, non-public information related to the tender offer can
directly or indirectly influence the market price of securities. Traditionally,
this non-public information was a tool for insider trading. Thus, securities
regulations in both Korea and the United States prohibit using non-public
information in an attempt to prevent manipulations of the market price.
Under the KSEA, any person who obtains undisclosed information relating
bidder's tender offer. Such statement shall also include the reason(s) for the position (including
the inability to take a position) disclosed therein.
Id.
170 id.
171 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(d).
171 Id. § 240.14d-100, items 1-9.
'1" See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 25.
' See Korean Commercial Act, supra note 135, arts. 399(l)-(3).
VOL. 10 No. 3
MAY 2001 TENDER OFFERS IN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES 531
to the tender offer in the course of performing his duties shall not use or
have another person use the information in connection with the tender
offer.' 75 The KSEA defines the term non-public material information as any
information that may have an important effect on an investors' judgment
about the investment and is not disclosed to the public by the concerned
corporation. 1
76
b. United States
Under the Exchange Act, any person who is in possession of material
information relating to the tender offer cannot use the information, unless
the information and its source are disclosed within a reasonable time. 177 In
addition, Section 14(e) contains a general antifraud provision, which applies
to all statements made and acts done in connection with the tender offer.
178
The Exchange Act does not have a statutory definition of the term
"materiality." Instead, the general standard of materiality was established by
the United States Supreme Court in TSC Industries v. Northway.179 In TSC
Industries, the Court held that "there must be a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."' 180 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 
1
used the "substantial likelihood" test established in TSC Industries for
determining materiality' 82 under Rule lOb-5, the SEC's general anti-fraud
provision. Thus, material information in the United States may be defined
as anything that "a reasonable [person] would attach importance to . . . in
determining his course of action."1
83
175 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 188-2(1).
176 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 188-2(2). Facts that require disclosure are provided in art. 186(1).
' 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a)(3).
178 ROBERT, supra note 121, at 551.
17' TSC Industries, Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
'80 Id. at 449.
181 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
82 Id. at 232.
8s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) [Tentative Draft No. 10, Apr. 20, 1964];
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 256(a) [Tentative Draft No. 2, 1973] (quoting
from CHARLES R. O'KELLY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATION AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCtATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1047 (2d ed. 1996)).
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D. Defense Against the Tender Offer and Directors' Potential Liability to
Shareholders
1. Korea
When the tender offer occurs, the KSEA prohibits defensive action by
the target company in order to prevent any undue advantage to majority
shareholders of the target company. 184 According to these provisions, during
a tender offer, the issuer of the target company's stocks shall not issue
securities that are related to the voting rights of target company's
shareholders. In addition, the issuer may not make a resolution of the board
of directors or hold a general meeting of stockholders regarding such
issuance. 185 However, if the issuer makes a resolution of the board of
directors or holds a general meeting of stockholders before the tender offer
statement is filed, the issuer of the stock can issue new equity securities,
even though the issuance could change the number of voting rights. 1
86
Since directors of the company have a duty of neutrality during a
hostile tender offer, the directors are jointly responsible for the damages to
the corporation, and to any third party, when damages arise from a
stockholders' defensive action. 187  However, because the KSEA prohibits
stockholders' defensive acts that may change the number of voting rights,'
88
if the issuance of a new voting stock is exercised, the issuance should be
automatically nullified. 
89
Generally, in Korea, directors of a company who negligently fail to
perform their duties are jointly and severally liable for damages to a third
party. 190 However, it is unclear whether stockholders fall within the
184 Song, supra note 53, at 29. A defensive action of the target company can take many forms,
including a presentation of a dissenting opinion about the tender offer, the issuance of voting stocks, such
as stock certificates, a certificate representing preemptive rights, convertible bonds, certificates of bond
with warrants, and certificates of exchangeable bonds, a the resolution of the board of directors, or a
general meeting of stockholders concerning the tender offer. Under the KSEA, defensive actions are
defined as those actions that may change the number of voting rights. See Enforcement Decree, supra note
23, art. 12-5.
185 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 23(4); Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 12-5.
186 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 23(4); Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 12-5.
87 See Korean Commercial Act, supra note 135, arts. 399(1), 401(1). "If directors have neglected to
perform their duties willfully or by gross negligence, they shall be jointly and severally liable for damages
to third person." Id.
188 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 23(4).
" 9 See Korean Commercial Act, supra note 135, art. 431(1). "When a judgment nullifying the
issuance of new shares becomes final and conclusive, such new shares shall be invalidated for the future."
Id.
19o See Korean Commercial Act, supra note 135, art. 401(1).
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definition of a third party.191 Thus, during a defensive action against the
tender offer, the company director could potentially be liable for both the
stockholders' direct and indirect damages when they negligently fail to
perform their required duties.
2. United States
In the United States, when a corporation becomes the subject of a
hostile tender offer, the target company usually tries to improve the tender
offer, repel the offer, or remain independent. The target company has
complete discretion when deciding to accept or reject the tender offer. The
United States does not have a specific provision prohibiting a target
company's defensive action, although companies must abide by the Section
14(e) prohibitions on material omissions, misstatements, deception, and
fraud.
There are differing opinions 92 regarding directors' defensive actions
against tender offers. However, the business judgment rule, as described
below, is generally used to evaluate the defensive actions of the target
company's directors.
93
In Aronson v. Lewis, 194 the Delaware Supreme Court defined the
business judgment rule as "a presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
'9' Since stockholders may suffer from independent losses aside from the damage to the corporation,
it is likely that stockholders will fall within the definition of a third person. However, the Korean Supreme
Court disagreed. See Judgment of Jan. 26, 1993, 91 Da 36093 (S. Korea). For more information, see Joo-
Chan Son, SANGBOP (SANG) [THE COMMERCIAL CODE(l)], SEOUL, 773-76 (1998).
192 See, eg., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fichel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161(1981) (a negative opinion on the director's
defensive action). But cf Ronald J. Gilson, Just Say No to Whom?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 121 (1990)
(in support of the directors' defensive action).
193 See ROBERT, supra note 121, at 579-82. Professor Clark suggests five rules that could be adopted
to govern the behavior of the target company's directors: (1) Pure passivity; (2) Modified passivity; (3)
Differential regulation; (4) Primary purpose test; and (5) Business judgment rule. As for the business
judgment rule, he explains,
the decision to commit corporate resources to takeover defense is a matter within the normal
business discretion of the target's directors and officers, and could not be successfully
challenged unless the plaintiff could prove some serious failure on the defendant's part-such as
gross negligence or palpable overreaching. Since target managers usually go through the forms
of carefulness-they hire expensive counsel and investment bankers, hold many meetings, and
leave a justificatory paper trail-and since they can and do allege the corporate good as a basis
for their defensive maneuvers, this rule makes it impossible to attack any but the most
outrageous defensive maneuvers.
Id. at 581-82.
"' Aronson et al. v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company."' 95 However, the same court later held, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.,1 96 that "if a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of
the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed."' 197 The court when on to explain that, "this entails an analysis by the
directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate
enterprise." 198 Defensive actions are acceptable when they entail "a
defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated by a
good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stockholders,
which in all circumstances must be free of any fraud or other
misconduct."' 99 In finding for the board of directors, the Unocal court stated
that the board had "reasonable grounds for believing there was a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness, a burden satisfied by a showing of good
faith and reasonable investigation. 2 °0
In Revlon v. MacAndrews,20 1 the court addressed the extent to which a
corporation can consider the "impact of a takeover threat on constituencies
other than shareholders. 20 2 The court concluded that the directors have a
fiduciary duty of care and loyalty only to the corporation and its
shareholders. 20 3 "Post-Revlon common law increasingly demands that the
target company act in a manner that will extract the highest possible value
for its shareholders. 20 4 However, many state laws authorize directors to act
not only for the benefit of the shareholders, employees, and customers, but
also for the local community in which the company is located.20 5
' Id. at 812.
:96 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
91 Id. at 955.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. The court added, "if the board of directors is disinterested, has acted in good faith and with
due care, its decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion will be upheld as a proper exercise of
business judgment ...Thus, unless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the directors'
decisions were primarily based on perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty
such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed, a Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the board." Id. at 959.
201 Revlon, Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
202 Id. at 176.
203 Id. at 179; Aronson et al. v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
204 Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target
Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L. 35, 81 (1988).2
o
5 Id. at 83. Some states prescribe a "stakeholder provision," which allows the board to take a much
broader view of corporate purpose and management duty. See id. at 81. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
607.0830(3) (West 1993):
In discharging his duties, a director may consider such factors as the director deems relevant,
including the long-term prospects and interests of the corporation and its shareholders, and the
social, economic, legal, or other effects of any action on the employees, suppliers, customers of
VOL. 10 No. 3
MAY 2001 TENDER OFFERS IN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES 535
In order to obtain the personal liability protection of the business
judgment rule for defensive actions in an attempted takeover, the target
company's directors must demonstrate that they had reasonable grounds for
believing that there was a danger to the corporation's welfare from the
takeover attempt; that the defensive measures were reasonable in relation to
the threat posed; that they acted in good faith based upon reasonable
investigation; and that the majority of the directors were disinterested.
3. Comparison
Since the KSEA specifically prohibits the target company's defensive
action, it is difficult to compare defensive actions in Korea with those the
United States. However, the KSEA does allow the target company the right
to present its opinion.2 °6 If the target company strongly presents a dissenting
opinion, the effect will be the same as employing a defensive action that is
currently prohibited. Therefore, it is not necessary to prohibit the target
company's defensive action by the law.
E. Penalties for Violations of Disclosure Requirements and Tender Offer
Regulations
1. Korea
Considering the usual objective of the tender offer, that is, takeover of
a company, restrictions on voting rights are the most effective way to
regulate violations of tender offer regulations. Consequently, when a person
purchases stocks in violation of tender offer regulations, she may not
exercise the voting rights of those stocks.20 7 One obvious problem is that the
KSEA does not state specifically which securities will have restricted voting
rights.20 8 According to the language of the Act, the scope of securities that
have restricted voting rights includes all stocks acquired in violation of the
tender offer. 2°9 However, since the tender offer regulations apply only when
more than 5% of the stocks are purchased,210 the securities comprising the
the corporation or its subsidiaries, the communities and society in which the corporation or its
subsidiaries operate, and the economy of the state and the nation.
Id.
206 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 25.
207 See id. art. 21-3.
20' See id. art. 21-3.
209 Kim, supra note 53, at 47.
210 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 2 1(1).
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first 5% are arguably not covered by the tender offer regulations. Thus, it is
reasonable to suggest that only the surplus securities over 5% should have
restricted voting rights.
The period in which the voting rights restriction applies extends from
the purchase date of the stocks until six months after the disposal of the
stocks to a third party.21 ' In addition, the FSC may order the disposal of
stocks purchased in violation of the regulations.1 2 While the KSEA does
not regulate the methods of disposal, the securities in question may not be
,,213
sold to "specially connected persons. Even in the case of a forced
disposal, the KSEA 214 prohibits the third party from exercising voting rights
for six months from the date of purchase.
The KSEA also imposes criminal sanctions on any person who
violates the tender offer regulations. When an individual violates a
215compulsory tender offer provision, fails to file the tender offer
21621
statement, restricts purchases by tender offer,217 or violates any other
provisions, 2 18 he may be punished by imprisonment for not more than two
219years, or by a monetary fine that does not exceed ten million won.
Additionally, a person who makes a false statement with regard to material
facts disclosed in the tender offer statement, or tender offer amendment
statement, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or
by a fine of not more than five million won.220 However, omissions of
material facts, and false statements with regard to material information made
by target company representatives, are not currently regulated by the KSEA.
2. United States
During the ten-day period after a person crosses the 5% threshold of
Section 13(d), thereby incurring disclosure obligations, the tender offeror
may purchase securities up to an additional 20% of the class of the equity
securities. From the time of the acquisition of the 20% of the securities until
the expiration of the ten-day period, he shall not vote or direct the voting of
2. Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 12.
:12 KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21-3.
212 Because the "specially connected persons" are treated as the tender offerors under the KSEA. See
KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21 (1); Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-3.
214 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 12.
215 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21(1).
216 See id.
217 See id. art. 23.
218 See id. art. 23-2(2).
219 See id. art. 209(4). The currency exchange often million won in U.S. dollars is about S8340.
220 Id. art. 210(6). The currency exchange of five million won in U.S. dollars is about $4170.
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the securities, or acquire an additional beneficial ownership interest in any
equity securities. 22 1 As in Korea, the Exchange Act does not specifically
describe the scope of the securities that will have voting right restrictions.
However, also as in Korea, since those possessing securities totaling less
than 5% are not forced to file a statement, it may be inferred that only the
surplus of 5% should have restricted voting rights.
The United States has only a general anti-fraud provision against
violation of the tender offer.222 It does not mention a private action for the
223
violation but can lead to criminal sanctions.
3. Comparison
The restriction period on voting rights in Korea, when compared to
the United States, is unreasonably long because the tender offeror can legally
purchase the securities after the statement filing date. Thus, the restriction
period should be in effect until the expiration of the tenth day after the
statement filing date. Further, Article 12 of the Enforcement Decree of the
KSEA, which restricts the third party's voting rights for six months, should
be revised to ensure free securities transactions, since it currently hinders
swift and harmonious securities transactions.
As for criminal sanctions in Korea, the KSEA prescribes only limited
224punishments for some violations.. By contrast, the United States has a
general anti-fraud provision for any person and for any omission,
misstatement, manipulation, deception, or fraud. 225 Korea should also adopt
a general anti-fraud provision with corresponding criminal sanctions in order
to enforce a fair and secure disclosure system in the Korean securities
market. Moreover, the penalty for all violations should be increased because
the present penalty is insufficient to effectively deter potential violators.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING KOREAN LAW
The Korean government must amend the KSEA. Despite two major
226 d ofeamendments, tender offer regulation under the KSEA remainscomplicated, especially the provisions relating to securities calculation and
221 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(f)(2).
222 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
223 Id.
224 See supra notes 219-220 and accompanying text.
225 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
226 See supra Part I.A.2.
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disclosure requirements. Amending the KSEA would enhance the efficacy
of the tender offer as a viable option for Korean business, protect individual
investors, and facilitate a free market in securities. Among the many
suggestions for improvement of Korean tender offer regulations listed in this
article, the following five recommendations represent the areas in the most
urgent need of reform.
A. Clarify the Definition of the Tender Offeror
The KSEA fails to adequately define the term "specially related
persons." Specifically, the meaning of "specially related persons" in Article
10-3(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the KSEA is vague and much broader
than its equivalent in the United States. Further, the KSEA fails to define
"equivalent to ownership. '227 Thus, these pieces of legislation regarding the
scope of the tender offeror indirectly cause confusion to the tender offer
process during securities transactions in Korea. Consequently, to eliminate
this. confusion the term "specially related persons" should be abolished and
the meaning of "persons acting in concert" should be concretely defined, as
it is in the United States.
B. Remove Potential Securities from the Scope of Applicable Securities
In Korea, the scope of applicable securities of the tender offer
currently include potential securities, such as stock certificates, certificates
representing preemptive rights, convertible bonds, and certificates of
exchangeable bonds. Since these securities do not have voting rights at the
moment of the tender offer, adding them to the scope of applicable
securities creates a heavy burden on the tender offeror. In addition,
including potential securities in the scope of determination of whether
tender offer regulations apply severely complicates calculations of the
percent of securities owned. As a result, potential securities should not
count towards the 5% threshold that triggers tender offer regulations.
C. Shorten the Six-Month Period
The applicable period to calculate whether tender offer regulations
227 While the Williams Act does not specifically define either "specially related persons" or
"equivalent to ownership," it does provide the meaning of the "beneficial owner," which, under Article 10-
3(4) of the Enforcement Decree, is related to the meaning of"equivalent to ownership."
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apply is the six months prior to the date of the purchase of stocks.228 In
comparison, in the United States the applicable period of the tender offer is
twenty business days from the date the tender offer is first published, sent, or
given to security holder. 229 Generally, while stockholders of target
companies would like to have sufficient time to make decisions regarding
the tender offer, the tender offeror usually wants to complete the transaction
as soon as possible. Ideally, the tender offer should be completed quickly in
order to maintain its function in a capital market. For this reason, Korea's
six-month period is too long to keep up with the function of the securities
market. Consequently, the six-month period is not reasonable and should be
shortened.
D. Require Disclosure of the Target Company's Opinion Regarding a
Tender Offer
The target company's opinion concerning a hostile take over, whether
it approves, dissents, or is neutral, is very important to investors when
making investment decisions. The presentation of a dissenting opinion
about the tender offer can be an effective action in a target company's
defense against the tender offer. The KSEA does not require the target
company to disclose such information, although the target company has the
right to present an opinion about the tender offer.230
Korea currently relies on the director's duty to the company under the
Korean Commercial Act231 to encourage target company disclosure. The
KSEA should follow the United States' pattern and require, not simply allow,
the target company to disclose material information, including its opinion of
the tender offer.
Further, due to the importance of the target company's opinion to
investors, the contents of the opinion should be accurate and detailed. The
KSEA only provides vague guidelines on the context of opinions, stating
that "the important matters shall not be omitted, and the contents shall be
such that no misunderstanding may be caused therefrom.- 232 However, this
can be interpreted many different ways. Consequently, the KSEA should
require the target company's disclosure, and prescribe the scope of
information in detail as well.
228 Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-2(1).
229 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (2001).
230 See id.
231 See Korean Commercial Act, supra note 135, arts. 399(l)-(3).
232 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 13.
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E. Reduce the Limitation on Voting Rights Associated with Securities
Acquired in Violation of Regulations
In Korea, the restricted period on exercising voting rights for
securities purchased in violation of tender offer regulations extends from the
date that the stocks are purchased to six months after disposal of the
stocks.2 33 According to the language of the KSEA,234 when the purchaser
who is ordered to dispose of the stocks by the FSC, sells the stocks to the
third party, the third party may not exercise voting rights for 6 months from
the date of purchasing the stocks.
Furthermore, Article 12 of the Enforcement Decree of the KSEA,
which currently restricts voting rights for six months, should be effective
only until the expiration of the tenth day from the date of the filing of the
statement. From that day, the tender offeror can legally purchase the
securities through the tender offer. 235 These changes would enhance and
improve securities transactions in Korea.
V. CONCLUSION
When comparing Korean tender offer regulation with that of the
Williams Act in the United States, it is clear that the KSEA is in need of
reform. Even though KSEA's tender offer regulations are based on related
laws from other countries, including the Williams Act, Korea retains some
unreasonable regulations when compared to the United States. Despite two
major amendments, the tender offer regulation in Korea is still very
complicated, particularly provisions concerning applicable securities,
calculation of securities, and the disclosure requirements.
Under the KSEA, the tender offer is an offer to buy stocks or a
solicitation of an offer to sell stocks against many and unspecified persons,
including buying stocks outside the KSE or KOSDAQ.236 The tender offer
is mandatory when a person intends to acquire 5% or more of the voting
stocks through purchase, exchange, bid, or any other acquisition by transfer
of more than ten shareholders in six months.237
The purpose of the KSEA is to protect investors by ensuring fairness
233 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 12.
234 Id. art. 12.
231 See id. art. 11-5; KSEA, supra note 12, art. 23.
236 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 21(3).
237 See id. art. 21(1); Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 10-2.
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in securities transactions. Consequently, the KSEA provides similar
provisions to those of the U.S. SEC Rules: the twenty-day tender offer
238 239period,238 the withdrawal and cancellation of the tender offer provision,
and the proportional purchase rule.240 However, the KSEA does not impose
a duty to disclose information on the target company. 24 From the
perspective of investor protection, the failure to require the target company
to disclosure material information is unreasonable.
The Williams Act ensures "that public shareholders who are
confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to
respond without adequate information." 242 Section 13(d) 243 is designed to
provide target shareholders with knowledge of a bidder's identity and
intentions. Section 14(d) 244 contains both disclosure requirements and
substantive restrictions for tender offers. Section 14(e) 245 is a general
antifraud provision, which requires persons engaged in the tender offer to
automatically disclose all material information. Section 13(e) 24 6 regulates an
issuer from purchasing its own securities that are subject to the Securities
Exchange Act in contravention of the SEC rules. To accomplish the
objectives of the Williams Act, the SEC provides some significant rules,
including the twenty-day offer period rule,247 the shareholder's withdrawal
rule,248 the pro rata acceptance rule,249 and the target company's disclosure
rule.25°
In comparison to their counterparts in the United States, the Korean
regulations are unclear and complicated. A legacy of hasty amendments has
left complex regulations that lack the necessary provisions to ensure secure
and fair securities transactions in the Korean securities market. Thus, to
enhance the role of the tender offer, to protect investors' benefits, and to
create a free market order against a high corporate competition, the tender
offer regulation of the KSEA should be carefully reconsidered using the U.S.
regulations as a model.
238 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 11-5.
239 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 24-2(3).
240 See Enforcement Decree, supra note 23, art. 13-2-2.
241 See KSEA, supra note 12, art. 25.
242 Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting Rondeau v. Mosine Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)).243 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
244 Id. § 78n(d).
211 Id. § 78n(e).
246 Id. § 78m(e).
247 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a).
248 See id. § 240.14d-7.
249 See id. § 240.14d-8.
250 See SEC Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (2001).

